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This paper is concerned with empirical and theoretical basis of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH). The paper begins with an overview of the statistical properties of asset 
returns at different frequencies (daily, weekly and monthly), and considers the evidence on 
return predictability, risk aversion and market efficiency. The paper then focuses on the 
theoretical foundation of the EMH, and show that market efficiency could co-exit with 
heterogeneous beliefs and individual irrationality so long as individual errors are cross 
sectionally weakly dependent in the sense defined by Chudik, Pesaran, and Tosetti (2010). 
But at times of market euphoria or gloom these individual errors are likely to become cross 
sectionally strongly dependent and the collective outcome could display significant departures 
from market efficiency. Market efficiency could be the norm, but it is likely to be punctuated 
with episodes of bubbles and crashes. The paper also considers if market inefficiencies 
(assuming that they exist) can be exploited for profit. 
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Part of this paper is based on my presentation at the CFS symposium “Market Efficiency 
Today” held in Frankfurt/Main on October 6, 2005 in honor of Eugene F. Fama. 1 Introduction
Economists have long been fascinated by the nature and sources of variations in
the stock market. By the early 1970￿ s a consensus had emerged among ￿nancial
economists suggesting that stock prices could be well approximated by a random walk
model and that changes in stock returns were basically unpredictable. Fama (1970)
provides an early, de￿nitive statement of this position. Historically, the ￿ random
walk￿theory of stock prices was preceded by theories relating movements in the
￿nancial markets to the business cycle. A prominent example is the interest shown
by Keynes in the variation in stock returns over the business cycle.
The e¢ cient market hypothesis (EMH) evolved in the 1960￿ s from the random
walk theory of asset prices advanced by Samuelson (1965). Samuelson showed that
in an informationally e¢ cient market price changes must be unforecastable. Kendall
(1953), Cowles (1960), Osborne (1959), Osborne (1962), and many others had already
provided statistical evidence on the random nature of equity price changes. Samuel-
son￿ s contribution was, however, instrumental in providing academic respectability
for the hypothesis, despite the fact that the random walk model had been around
for many years; having been originally discovered by Louis Bachelier, a French sta-
tistician, back in 1900.
Although a number of studies found some statistical evidence against the ran-
dom walk hypothesis, these were dismissed as economically unimportant (could not
generate pro￿table trading rules in the presence of transaction costs) and statisti-
cally suspect (could be due to data mining). For example, Fama (1965), concluded
that ￿...there is no evidence of important dependence from either an investment or a
statistical point of view.￿ . Despite its apparent empirical success, the random walk
model was still a statistical statement and not a coherent theory of asset prices. For
example, it need not hold in markets populated by risk averse traders, even under
market e¢ ciency.
There now exist many di⁄erent versions of the EMH, and one of the aims of this
paper is to provide a simple framework where alternative versions of the EMH can be
articulated and discussed. We begin with an overview of the statistical properties of
asset returns at di⁄erent frequencies (daily, weekly and monthly), and consider the
evidence on return predictability, risk aversion and market e¢ ciency. We then focus
on the theoretical foundation of the EMH, and show that market e¢ ciency could
co-exit with heterogeneous beliefs and individual ￿ irrationality￿ , so long as individual
errors are cross sectionally weakly dependent in the sense de￿ned by Chudik, Pesaran,
and Tosetti (2010). But at times of market euphoria or gloom these individual errors
are likely to become cross sectionally strongly dependent and the collective outcome
1could display signi￿cant departures from market e¢ ciency. Market e¢ ciency could
be the norm, but most likely it will be punctuated by episodes of bubbles and crashes.
To test for such episodes we argue in favour of compiling survey data on individual
expectations of price changes that are combined with information on whether such
expectations are compatible with market equilibrium. A trader who believes that
asset prices are too high (low) might still expect further price rises (falls). Periods
of bubbles and crashes could result if there are su¢ ciently large numbers of such
traders that are prepared to act on the basis of their beliefs. The paper also considers
if periods of market ine¢ ciency can be exploited for pro￿t. We conclude with some
general statements on new research directions.
We begin with some basic concepts and set out how returns are computed over
di⁄erent horizons and assets, and discuss some of the known stylized facts about
returns by means of simple statistical models.
2 Prices and returns
2.1 Single period returns
Let Pt be the price of a security at date t. The absolute price change over the period
t ￿ 1 to t is given by Pt ￿ Pt￿1, the relative price change by
Rt = (Pt ￿ Pt￿1)=Pt￿1
the gross return (excluding dividends) on security by
1 + Rt = Pt=Pt￿1
and the log price change by
rt = ￿ln(Pt) = ln(1 + Rt)
It is easily seen that for small relative price changes the log-price change and the
relative price change are almost identical.
In the case of daily observations when dividends are negligible, 100￿Rt measures
the per cent return on the security, and 100￿rt is the continuously compounded return.
Rt is also known as discretely compounded return. The continuously compounded
return, rt, is particularly convenient in the case of temporal aggregation (multi-
period returns - see below), while the discretely compounded returns are convenient
for use in cross-sectional aggregation, namely aggregation of returns across di⁄erent
2instruments in a portfolio. For example, for a portfolio composed of N instruments
with weights wi;t￿1, (
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Often rpt is approximated by
PN
i=1 wi;t￿1rit.
When dividends are paid out we have
Rt = (Pt ￿ Pt￿1)=Pt￿1 + Dt=Pt￿1
t ￿ln(Pt) + Dt=Pt￿1
where Dt is the dividend paid out during the holding period.
2.2 Multi-period returns
Single-period price changes (returns) can be used to compute multi-period price






1 + Rt(h) = Pt=Pt￿h
and
rt(h) = ln(Pt=Pt￿h) = rt + rt￿1 + ::: + rt￿h+1
where rt￿i, i = 0;1;2;:::;h ￿ 1 are the single-period returns. For example, weekly
returns is de￿ned by rt(5) = rt+rt￿1+:::+rt￿4. Similarly, since there are 25 business
days in one month, then the 1-month return can be computed as the sum of the last
25 1-day returns, or rt(25).
2.3 Overlapping returns
Note that multi-period returns have overlapping daily observations. In the case of
weekly returns, rt(5) and rt￿1(5) have the four daily returns, rt￿1+rt￿2+rt￿3+rt￿4
3in common. As a result the multi-period returns will be serially correlated even if
the underlying daily returns are not serially correlated. One way of avoiding the
overlap problem would be to sample the multi-period returns h periods apart. But
this is likely to be ine¢ cient as it does not make use of all available observations. A
more appropriate strategy would be to use the overlapping returns but allow for the
fact that this will induce serial correlations. For further details see Pesaran, Pick,
and Timmerman (2010).
3 Statistical models of returns
A simple model of returns (or log price changes) is given by
rt+1 = ￿ln(Pt+1) = pt+1 ￿ pt
= ￿t + ￿t"t+1; t = 1;2;:::;T (1)
where ￿t and ￿2
t are the conditional mean and the conditional variance of returns
(with respect to the information set ￿t available at time t) and "t+1 represents the
unpredictable component of return. Two popular distributions for "t+1 are
"t+1 j ￿t s IID Z






where Z s N(0;1) stands for a standard normal distribution, and Tv stands for
Student￿ s t with v degrees of freedom. Unlike the normal distribution that has
moments of all orders, Tv only has moments of order v ￿ 1 and smaller. For the
Student￿ s t to have a variance, for example, we need v > 2.
Since rt+1 = ln(1 + Rt+1), where Rt+1 = (Pt+1 ￿ Pt)=Pt, it then follows that
under "t+1 j ￿t s IID Z, the price level, Pt+1 conditional on ￿t will be lognormally
distributed. Note that ￿t = (Pt;Pt￿1;::::) and ￿t = (rt;rt￿1;::::) convey the same
information and are equivalent. Hence, Pt+1 = Pt exp(rt+1), and we have1
E(Pt+1 j￿t) = PtE(exp(rt+1) j ￿t)






1Using properties of the moment generating function of normal variates, if x v N(￿x;￿2
x) then,
E [exp(x)] = exp(￿x + :5￿2
x):
4Similarly,
V ar(Pt+1 j￿t) = P
2








In practice, it is much more convenient to work with log returns, rt+1, rather than
asset prices.






























It is easily seen that
E (Tv) = 0, and V ar(Tv) =
v
v ￿ 2
A large part of ￿nancial econometrics is concerned with alternative ways of mod-
elling the conditional mean (mean returns), ￿t, the conditional variance (asset re-
turn volatility), ￿t, and the cumulative probability distribution of the errors, "t+1.
A number of issues need to be addressed in order to choose an adequate model. In
particular:
- Is the distribution of returns normal?
- Is the distribution of returns constant over time?
- Are returns statistically independent over time?
- Are squares or absolute values of returns independently distributed over time?
- What are the cross correlation of returns on di⁄erent instruments?
The above modelling issues can be readily extended to the case where we are
concerned with a vector of asset returns, rt = (r1t;r2t;:::rmt)0. In this case we also
need to model the pair-wise conditional correlations of asset returns, namely
Corr(rit;rjt j ￿t) =
Cov(rit;rjt j ￿t)
p
V ar(rit j ￿t)V ar(rjt j ￿t)
5Typically the conditional variances and correlations are modelled using exponen-
tial smoothing procedures or the multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroskedastic models developed in the econometric literature.
3.1 Percentiles, critical values and Value at Risk
Suppose a random variable r (say daily returns on an instrument) has the probability
density function f(r). Then the pth percentile of the distribution of r, denoted by
Cp, is de￿ned as that value of return such that p percent of the returns fall below it.
Mathematically we have




In the literature on risk management Cp is used to compute ￿ Value at Risk￿or V aR
for short. For p = 1% , Cp associated with the one-sided critical value of the normal
distribution is given by ￿2:33￿, where ￿ is the standard deviation of returns.
In hypothesis testing Cp is known as the critical value of the test associated with
a (one-sided) test of size p. In the case of two-sided tests of size p, the associated
critical value is computed as Cp=2.
3.2 Measures of departure from normality
The normal probability density function for rt+1 conditional on the information at













with ￿t = E(rt+1 j ￿t) and ￿2
t = E [(rt+1 ￿ ￿t)2 j ￿t] being the conditional mean
and variance. If the return process is stationary, unconditionally we also have ￿ =
E(rt+1), and ￿2 = E [(rt+1 ￿ ￿t)2].












t=1(rt ￿ ￿ r)j
T
; j = 2;3;4
6Table 1: Descriptive statistics for daily returns on SP 500, FTSE 100, German DAX, and Nikkei
225
Variables SP FTSE DAX NK
Maximum 14.11 10.05 12.83 20.70
Minimum -9.88 -9.24 -8.89 -13.07
Mean (￿ r) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
S. D. (^ ￿) 1.39 1.33 1.65 1.68
Skewness (
p
b1) 0.35 0.06 0.24 0.16
Kurtosis (b2) 14.3 9.7 8.5 17.8
JB statistic 13453.6 4713.1 3199.2 23000.8
For a normal distribution
p
b1 t 0, and b2 t 3. In particular
^ ￿ = ￿ r =
T X
t=1
rt=T; ^ ￿ =
sPT
t=1(rt ￿ ￿ r)2
T ￿ 1








Under the joint null hypothesis that b1 = 0 and b2 = 3, the JB statistic is asymp-
totically distributed (as T ! 1) as a chi-squared with 2 degrees of freedom, ￿2
2:
Therefore, a value of JB in excess of 5:99 will be statistically signi￿cant at the 95
per cent con￿dence level, and the null hypothesis of normality will be rejected.
4 Empirical evidence: statistical properties of re-
turns
Table 1 gives a number of statistics for daily returns (￿100) on four main equity
index futures, namely S&P 500 (SP), FTSE 100 (FTSE), German DAX (DAX),
and Nikkei 225 (NK), over the period 3-Jan-00 to 31-Aug-09 (for a total of 2,519
observations).
The kurtosis coe¢ cients are particularly large for all the four equity futures and
exceed the benchmark value of 3 for the normal distribution. There is some evi-
dence of positive skewness, but it is of second order importance as compared to the
7magnitude of excess kurtosis coe¢ cient given by, b2 ￿ 3. The large values of excess
kurtosis is re￿ ected in the huge values of the JB statistics reported in 1. Also under
the assumption that returns are normally distributed, we would have expected the
maximum and minimum of daily returns to fall (with 99% con￿dence) in the region
of ￿ 2.33￿ S. D., which is ￿3:24 for SP500, as compared to the observed values of
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Figure 1: Histogram and Normal curve for daily returns on SP500 (over the period 3-Jan-00 to
31-Aug-09)
The departure from normality is particularly pronounced over the past decade
where markets have been subject to two important episodes of ￿nancial crises: the
collapse of markets in 2000 after the dot-com bubble and the stock market crash of
2008 after the 2007 credit crunch. (see Figure 2).
However, the evidence of departure from normality can be seen in daily returns
even before 2000. For example, over the period 3-Jan-94 to 31-Dec-99 (1565 daily
observations) kurtosis coe¢ cient of returns on SP500 was 9.5 which is still well above
the benchmark value of 3. The recent ￿nancial crisis has accentuated the situation
but can not be viewed as the cause of the observed excess kurtosis of equity returns.
Similar results are also obtained if we consider weekly returns. The kurtosis
coe¢ cients estimated using weekly returns over the period January 2000 to the end
of August 2009 (504 weeks) were 12.4, 15.07, 8.9 and 15.2 for SP500, FTSE, DAX,
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Figure 2: Daily returns on SP500 (over the period 3-Jan-00 to 31-Aug-09)
using daily observations for SP500 and Nikkei, but are quite a bit higher for FTSE.
For DAX daily and weekly observations yield a very similar estimate of the kurtosis
coe¢ cient.
For currencies the kurtosis coe¢ cient of returns (measured in terms of US dollar)
varies from 4.5 for euro to 13.8 for the Australian dollar. The estimates computed
using daily observations over the period 03-Jan-00 to 31-Aug-09 are summarized
in Table 2. The currencies considered are the British pound (GBP), euro (EU),
Japanese yen (JPY), Swiss franc (CHF), Canadian dollar (CAD), and Australian
dollar (AD), all measured in terms of US dollar.
The returns on government bonds are generally less fat-tailed than the returns
on equities and currencies. But their distribution still show a signi￿cant degree of
departure from normality.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on daily returns on the main four govern-
ment bond futures: US T-Note 10Y (BU), Europe Euro Bund 10Y (BE), Japan
Government Bond 10Y (BJ), and UK Long Gilts 8.75-13Y (BG) over the period
03-Jan-00 to 31-Aug-09.
It is clear that for all the three asset classes that there are signi￿cant departures
from normality which needs to be taken into account when analysing ￿nancial time
series.
9Table 2: Descriptive statistics for daily returns on British pound, euro, Japanese yen, Swiss franc,
Canadian dollar, and Australian dollar
Variables JPY EU GBP CHF CAD AD
Maximum 4.53 3.17 3.41 4.58 5.25 6.21
Minimum -3.93 -3.01 -5.04 -3.03 -3.71 -9.50
Mean (￿ r) -.006 .016 .007 .012 .013 .022
S. D. (^ ￿) -.65 .65 .60 .70 .59 .90
Skewness (
p
b1) -.28 .01 -.35 .12 .09 -.76
Kurtosis (b2) 5.99 4.5 7.2 4 .9 9.1 13.8
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for daily returns on US T-Note 10Y, Europe Euro Bund 10Y, Japan
Government Bond 10Y, and, UK Long Gilts 8.75-13Y
Variables BU BE BG BJ
Maximum 3.63 1.48 2.43 1.53
Minimum -2.40 -1.54 -1.85 -1.41
Mean (￿ r) .0 .01 .01 .01
S. D. (^ ￿) .43 .32 .35 .24
Skewness (
p
b1) -.004 -.18 .02 -.18
Kurtosis (b2) 6.67 4.49 6.02 6.38
104.1 Other stylized facts about asset returns
Asset returns are typically uncorrelated over time, are di¢ cult to predict and as we
have seen tend to have distributions that are fat-tailed. In contrast the absolute or
squares of asset returns (that measure risk), namely jrtj or r2
t, are serially correlated
and tend to be predictable. It is interesting to note that rt can be written as
rt = sign(rt)jrtj
where sign(rt) = +1 if rt > 0 and sign(rt) = ￿1 if rt ￿ 0. Since jrtj is predictable, it
is, therefore, the non-predictability of sign(rt), or the direction of the market, which
lies behind the di¢ culty of predicting returns.
The extent to which returns are predictable depends on the forecast horizon,
the degree of market volatility, and the state of the business cycle. Predictability
tends to rise during crisis periods. Similar considerations also apply to the degree
of fat-tailedness of the underlying distribution and the cross correlations of asset
returns. The return distributions become less fat-tailed as the horizon is increased,
and cross correlations of asset returns become more predictable with the horizon.
Cross correlation of returns also tend to increase with market volatility. The analysis
of time variations in the cross correlation of asset returns is beyond the scope of
this paper. But the interested reader might wish to consult (Pesaran and Pesaran
2010) where multivariate conditional volatility models are ￿tted to weekly returns
on equities, bonds and currencies.
In the case of daily returns, equity returns tend to be negatively serially corre-
lated. During normal times they are small and only marginally signi￿cant statisti-
cally, but become relatively large and attain a high level of statistical signi￿cance
during crisis periods. These properties are illustrated in the following empirical ap-
plication.
The ￿rst and second order serial correlation coe¢ cients of daily returns on SP500
over the period 3-Jan-00 to 31-Aug-07 are ￿0:015 (0:0224) and ￿0:0458 (0:0224),
respectively, but increase to ￿0:068 (0:0199)and ￿0:092 (0:0200) once the sample is
extended to the end of August 2009 which covers the 2008 global ￿nancial crisis.2
Similar patterns are also observed for other equity indices. For currencies the evi-
dence is more mixed. In the case of major currencies such as euro and yen there is
little evidence of serial correlation in returns and this outcome does not seem much
a⁄ected by whether one considers normal or crisis periods. For other currencies there
is some evidence of negative serial correlation, particularly at times of crisis. For ex-
ample, over the period 3-Jan-00 to 31-Aug-09 the ￿rst order serial correlation of daily
2The ￿gures in brackets are standard errors.
11returns on Australian dollar amounts to ￿0:056 (0:0199), but becomes statistically
insigni￿cant if we exclude the crisis period. There is also very little evidence of serial
correlation in daily returns on the four major government bonds that we have been
considering. This outcome does not depend on whether the crisis period is included
in the sample. Irrespective of whether the underlying returns are serially correlated,
their absolute values (or their squares) are highly serially correlated, often over many
periods. For example, over the 3-Jan-00 to 31-Aug-09 period the ￿rst and second
order serial correlation coe¢ cients of absolute return on SP500 are 0:2644(0:0199);
0:3644(0:0204); for euro they are 0:0483(0:0199) and 0:1125(0:0200), and for US 10Y
bond they are 0:0991(0:0199) and 0:1317(0:0201). The serial correlation in absolute
returns tend to decay very slowly and continue to be statistically signi￿cant event
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Figure 3: Autocorrelation function of the absolute values of SP500 (over the period 3-Jan-00 to
31-Aug-09)
It is also interesting to note that there is little correlation between rt and jrtj.
Based on the full sample ending in August 2009, this correlation is ￿:0003 for SP500,
0:025 for euro, and 0:009 for the US 10Y bond.
124.2 Monthly stock market returns
Many of the regularities and patterns documented for returns using daily or weekly
observations can also be seen in monthly observations, once a su¢ ciently long period
is considered. For the US stock market long historical monthly data on prices and
dividends are compiled by Shiller and can be downloaded from his homepage3. An
earlier version of this data set has been analyzed in Shiller (2005). Monthly returns
on SP500 (inclusive of dividends) is computed as
RSPt = 100
￿
SPt ￿ SPt￿1 + SPDIVt
SPt￿1
￿
where SPt is the monthly spot price index of SP500 and SPDIVt denotes the as-
sociated dividends on the SP500 index. Over the period 1871m1 to 2009m9 (a
total of 1664 monthly observations) the coe¢ cient of skewness and kurtosis of RSP
amounted to 1.07 and 23.5 per cents, respectively. The excess kurtosis coe¢ cient
of 20.5 is much higher than the ￿gure of 11.3 obtained for the daily observations
on SP over the period 3-Jan-00 to 31-Aug-09. Also as before the skewness coe¢ -
cient is relatively small. However, the monthly returns show a much higher degree
of serial correlation and a lower degree of volatility as compared to daily or weekly
returns. The correlation coe¢ cients of RSP are 0:346 (0:0245) and 0:077 (0:027);
and the serial correlation coe¢ cients continue to be statistically signi￿cant up to the
lag order of 12 months. Also, the pattern of serial correlations in absolute monthly
returns, jRSPtj, is not that di⁄erent from that of the serial correlation in RSPt ,
which suggests a lower degree of return volatility (as compared to the volatility of
daily or weekly returns) once the e⁄ects of mean returns are taken into account.
Similar, but less pronounced, results are obtained if we exclude the 1929 stock
market crash and focus on the post World War II period. The coe¢ cients of skew-
ness and kurtosis of monthly returns over the period 1948m1 to 2009m9 (741 obser-
vations) are -0.49 and 5.2, respectively. The ￿rst and second order serial correlation
coe¢ cients of returns are 0:361 (0:0367) and 0:165 (0:041), respectively. The main
di⁄erence between these sub-sample estimates and those obtained for the full sample
is the much lower estimate for the kurtosis coe¢ cient. But even the lower post 1948
estimates suggest a signi￿cant degree of fat-tailedness in the monthly returns.
3See http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
135 Stock return regressions
Consider the linear excess return regression
Rt+1 ￿ r
f
t = a + b1x1t + b2x2t + ::: + bkxkt + "t+1 (4)
where Rt+1 is the one-period holding return on an stock index, such as FTSE or Dow
Jones, de￿ned by
Rt+1 = (Pt+1 + Dt+1 ￿ Pt)=Pt (5)
Pt is the stock price at the end of the period and Dt+1 is the dividend paid out over
the period t to t + 1, and xit , i = 1;2;:::;k are the factors/variables thought to be
important in predicting stock returns. Finally, r
f
t is the return on the government
bond with one-period to maturity (the period to maturity of the bond should be
exactly the same as the holding period of the stock). Rt+1 ￿ r
f
t is known as the
excess return (return on stocks in excess of the return on the safe asset). Note also
that r
f
t would be known to the investor/trader at the end of period t, before the
price of stocks, Pt+1, is revealed at the end of period t + 1.
Examples of possible stock market predictors are past changes in macroeconomic
variables such as interest rates, in￿ ation, dividend yield (Dt=Pt￿1), price earnings
ratio, output growth, and term premium (the di⁄erence in yield of a high grade and
a low grade bond such as AAA rated minus BAA rated bonds).
For individual stocks the relevant stock market regression is the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM), augmented with potential predictors:
Ri;t+1 = ai + b1ix1t + b2ix2t + ::: + bkixkt + ￿iRt+1 + "i;t+1 (6)
where Ri;t+1 is the holding period return on asset i (shares of ￿rm i), de￿ned similarly
as Rt+1. The asset-speci￿c regressions (6) could also include ￿rm speci￿c predictors,
such as Rit or its higher order lags, book-to-market value or size of ￿rm i. Under
market e¢ ciency, as characterized by CAPM,
ai = 0, b1i = b2i = :::: = bki = 0
and only the ￿ betas￿ , ￿i, will be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Under CAPM, the
value of ￿i captures the risk of holding the share i with respect to the market.
6 Market e¢ ciency and stock market predictabil-
ity
It is often argued that if stock markets are e¢ cient then it should not be possible to
predict stock returns, namely that none of the variables in the stock market regression
14(4) should be statistically signi￿cant. Some writers have even gone so far as to
equate stock market e¢ ciency with the non-predictability property. But this line of
argument is not satisfactory and does not help in furthering our understanding of
how markets operate. The concept of market e¢ ciency needs to be de￿ned separately
from predictability. In fact, it is easily seen that stock market returns will be non-
predictable only if market e¢ ciency is combined with risk neutrality.
6.1 Risk neutral investors
Suppose there exists a risk free asset such as a government bond with a known
payout. In such a case an investor with an initial capital of $At, is faced with two
options:




at the end of the next period.
- Option 2: switch to stocks by purchasing At=Pt shares, hold them for one
period and expect to receive
$(At=Pt)(Pt+1 + Dt+1)
at the end of period t + 1.
A risk-neutral investor will be indi⁄erent between the certainty of $(1 + r
f
t )At;
and the his/her expectations of the uncertain payout of option 2. Namely, for such
a risk neutral investor
(1 + r
f
t )At = E [(At=Pt)(Pt+1 + Dt+1)j￿t] (7)
where ￿t is the investor￿ s information at the end of period t. This relationship is
called the ￿ arbitrage condition￿ . Using (5) we now have
Pt+1 + Dt+1 = Pt (1 + Rt+1)
and the above arbitrage condition can be simpli￿ed to











This result establishes that if the investor forms his/her expectations of future stock
(index) returns taking account of all market information e¢ ciently, then the excess
return, Rt+1 ￿ r
f
t , should not be predictable using any of the market information
that are available at the end of period t. Notice that r
f
t is known at time t and is
therefore included in ￿t. Hence, under the joint hypothesis of market e¢ ciency and
risk neutrality we must also have E (Rt+1 j￿t) = r
f
t .
The above set up can also be used to derive conditions under which asset prices
can be characterised as a random walk model. Suppose, the risk free rate, r
f
t ; in
addition to being known at time t, is also constant over time and given by rf. Then













[E (Pt+1 j￿t) + E (Dt+1 j￿t)]








E (Pt+j j￿t) = 0








E (Dt+j j￿t) (9)
that equates the level of stock price to the present discounted stream of the dividends
expected to occur to the asset over the in￿nite future. The transversality condition
rules out rational speculative bubbles and is satis￿ed if the asset prices are not
expected to rise faster than the exponential decay rate determined by the discount
factor, 0 < 1=(1 + rf) < 1. It is now easily seen that if Dt follows a random walk so
will Pt. For example, suppose
Dt = Dt￿1 + "t (10)
where "t is a white noise process. Then





Therefore, we also have
Pt = Pt￿1 + ut (12)
where ut = "t=rf.
The random walk property holds even if rf = 0, since in such a case it would be
reasonable to expect no dividends are also paid out, namely Dt = 0. In this case the
arbitrage condition becomes
E (Pt+1 j￿t) = Pt (13)
which is satis￿ed by the random walk model but is in fact more general than the
random walk model. An asset price that satis￿es (13) is a martingale process. Ran-
dom walk processes with zero drift are martingale processes but not all martingale
processes are random walks. For example, the price process









where "t is a white noise process is a martingale process with respect to the infor-
mation set ￿t, but it is clearly not a random walk process, unless ￿ = 0.
Other modi￿cations of the random walk theory is obtained if it is assumed that
dividends follow a geometric random walk which is a more realistic than the linear
dividend model assumed in (10). In this case
Dt+1 = Dt exp(￿d + ￿d￿t+1) (14)
where ￿d and ￿d are mean and standard deviation of the growth rate of the dividends.
If it is further assumed that ￿t+1 j￿t is N(0;1), we have






































< 1 ensures that the in￿nite sum in (9) is
convergent and ￿ > 0. Under this set up ln(Pt) = ln(Dt) ￿ ln(￿); and
ln(Pt) = ln(Pt￿1) + ￿d + ￿d￿t (16)
which establishes that in this case it is log prices that follow the random walk model.
This is a special case of the statistical model of return, (1), discussed in Section 3,
where ￿t = ￿d, and ￿t = ￿d.
There are, however, three di⁄erent types of empirical evidence that shed doubt
on the empirical validity of the present value model under risk neutrality.
1. The model predicts a constant price-dividend ratio for a large class of the div-
idend processes. Two prominent examples being the linear and the geometric
random walk models, (10) and (14), discussed above. For more general div-
idend processes the price-dividend ratio, ￿t = Pt=Dt; could be time-varying,
but it must be mean-reverting, in the sense that shocks to prices and dividends
must eventually cancel out. In reality, the price-dividend ratio vary consider-
ably over time, show a high degree of persistent, and in general it is not possible
to reject the hypothesis that the processes for ￿t or ln(￿t) contain a unit root.
For the Shiller data discussed in 4.2 the autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the log
dividend to price ratio computed over the period 1871m1 to 2009m9 is 0:994
(0:024) and falls very gradually as its order is increased and amounts to 0:879
(0:111) at the lag order 12.
2. We have already established that under risk neutrality excess returns must
not be predictable. See (8). Yet there is ample evidence of excess return
predictability at least in periods of high market volatility. For example, it is
possible to explain 15% of the variations in monthly excess returns on SP500
over the period 1872m2-2009m9 by running a linear regression of the excess
return on a constant and its 12 lagged values - namely by a univariate AR(12)
process. This ￿gure rises to 19% if we exclude the 1929 stock market crash and
focus on the post 1948 period. See also the references cited in Section 7.1.
3. To derive the geometric random walk model of asset prices, (16), from the
present value model under risk neutrality, we have assumed that innovations
to the dividend process are normally distributed. This implies that innovations
to asset returns must also be normally distributed. But the empirical evidence
discussed in Section 4 above clearly shows that innovations to asset returns tend
to be fat-tailed, and often signi￿cantly depart from normality. This anomaly
between the theory and the evidence is also di¢ cult to reconcile. Under the
18present value model prices will have fat-tailed innovations only if the dividends
that drive asset prices are also fat-tailed. But under the geometric random
walk model for dividends (14), E (Dt+j j￿t) need not exist if the dividend
innovations, ￿t, are fat-tailed. One important example arises when ￿t has the
Student t distribution as de￿ned by (3). For the derivation of the present value
expression in this case we need E(exp(￿d￿t+j)), which is the moment generating
function of ￿t+j evaluated at ￿d. But the Student t distribution does not have
a moment generating function, and hence the present value formula can not be
computed when innovations to the dividends are t distributed.
6.2 Risk averse investors
In addition to the above documented empirical shortcomings, it is also important to
note that risk neutrality is a behavioral assumption and need not hold even if all
market information is processed e¢ ciently by all the market participants. A more
reasonable way to proceed is to allow some or all of the investors to be risk averse.
In this more general case the certain pay out, (1+r
f
t )At, and the expectations of the
uncertain pay out, E [(At=Pt)(Pt+1 + Dt+1)j￿t], will not be the same and di⁄er by
a (possibly) time-varying risk premium which could also vary with the level of the
initial capital, At. More speci￿cally, we have
E [(At=Pt)(Pt+1 + Dt+1)j￿t] = (1 + r
f
t )At + ￿tAt
where ￿t is the premium per $ of invested capital required (expected) by the investor.








and it is no longer necessary true that under market e¢ ciency excess returns are
non-predictable. The extent to which excess returns can be predicted will depend on
the existence of a historically stable relationship between the risk premium, ￿t; and
the macro and business cycle indicators such as changes in interest rates, dividends
and various business cycle indicators.
In the context of the consumption capital asset pricing model ￿t is determined
by the ex ante correlation of excess returns and changes in the marginal utility of
consumption. In the case of a representative consumer with the single period util-
ity function, u(ct), the ￿rst-order inter-temporal optimization condition (the Euler











19where ct denotes the consumer￿ s real consumption in period t. Using the above















For a power utility function, u(ct) = (c
1￿￿
t ￿ 1)=(1 ￿ ￿), and u0(ct+1)=u0(ct) =
exp(￿￿￿ln(ct+1)), where ￿ > 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. In this





This result shows that the risk premium depends on the covariance of asset returns
with the marginal utility of consumption. The premium demanded by the investor
to hold the stock is higher if the return on the asset co-vary positively with consump-
tion. The extent of this co-variation depends on the magnitude of the risk aversion
coe¢ cient ￿: For plausible values of ￿ (in the range 1 to 3) and historically observed
values of the consumption growth, we would expect ￿t to be relatively small, below 1
per cent per annum. However, using annual observations over relatively long periods
one obtains a much larger estimate for ￿t. This was ￿rst pointed out by Mehra and
Prescott (1985) who found that in the 90 years from 1889 to 1978 the average estimate
of ￿t in fact amounted to 6.18 per cent per annum, which could only be reconciled
with the theory if one was prepared to consider an implausibly large value for the
relative risk aversion coe¢ cient (in the regions of 30 or 40). The large discrepancy
between the historical estimate of ￿t based on Rt+1 ￿ r
f
t , and the theory-consistent
estimate of ￿t based on (18) is known as the ￿ equity premium puzzle￿ . There have
been many attempts in the literature to resolve the puzzle by modi￿cations to the
utility function, attitudes towards risk, allowing for the possibility of rare events, and
the heterogeneity in asset holdings and preferences across consumers. For reviews
see Kocherlakota (2003) and Mehra and Prescott (2003).






and ￿t as given by
(18) is resolved, the di⁄erences in the higher moments of historically and theory-
based risk premia, are likely to be important empirical issues of concern. It seems
4Let Xt+1 = Rt+1 ￿ r
f
t and Yt+1 = u0(ct+1)=u0(ct), and write the Euler equation (17 ) as
E [Xt+1Yt+1 j￿t] = 0 = Cov [Xt+1Yt+1 j￿t] + E [Xt+1 j￿t]E [Yt+1 j￿t]
Then the required results follow immediately, also noting that r
f
t is known at time t and hence has
a zero correlation with u0(ct+1)=u0(ct).
20di¢ cult to reconcile the high volatility of excess returns with the low volatility of
consumption growth that are observed historically.
7 Return predictability and alternative versions
of the e¢ cient market hypothesis
In his 1970 review, Fama distinguishes between three di⁄erent forms of the EMH:
1. The weak form asserts that all price information is fully re￿ ected in asset prices,
in the sense that current price changes can not be predicted from past prices.
This weak form was also introduced in an unpublished paper by Roberts (1967).
2. The semi-strong form that requires asset price changes to fully re￿ ect all pub-
licly available information and not only past prices.
3. The strong form that postulates that prices fully re￿ ect information even if
some investor or group of investors have monopolistic access to some informa-
tion.
Fama regarded the strong form version of the EMH as a benchmark against
which the other forms of market e¢ ciencies are to be judged. With respect to the
weak form version he concludes that the test results strongly support the hypothesis,
and considered the various departures documented as economically unimportant. He
reached a similar conclusion with respect to the semi-strong version of the hypothesis;
although as he noted, the empirical evidence available at the time was rather limited
and far less comprehensive as compared to the evidence on the weak version.
The three forms of the EMH present di⁄erent degrees whereby public and private
information are revealed in transaction prices. It is di¢ cult to reconcile all the three
versions to the mainstream asset pricing theory, and as we shall see below a closer
connection is needed between market e¢ ciency and the speci￿cation of the model
economy that underlies it.
7.1 Dynamic stochastic equilibrium formulations and the
joint hypothesis problem
Evidence on the semi-strong form of the EMH was revisited by Fama in a second
review of the E¢ cient Capital Markets published in 1991. By then it was clear
that the distinction between the weak and the semi-strong forms of the EMH was
21redundant. The random walk model could not be maintained either - in view of more
recent studies, in particular that of Lo and MacKinlay (1988).
A large number of studies in the ￿nance literature had con￿rmed that stock re-
turns over di⁄erent horizons (days, weeks, and months) can be predicted to some
degree by means of interest rates, dividend yields and a variety of macroeconomic
variables exhibiting clear business cycle variations. A number of studies also showed
that returns tend to be more predictable the longer the forecast horizon. While
the vast majority of these studies had looked at the US stock market, an emerging
literature has also considered the UK stock market. US studies include Balvers, Cosi-
mano, and MacDonald (1990), Breen, Glosten, and Jagannathan (1989), Campbell
(1987), Fama and French (1989), and subsequently by Ferson and Harvey (1993),
Kandel and Stambaugh (1996), Pesaran and Timmermann (1994), and Pesaran and
Timmermann (1995). See Granger (1992) for a survey of the methods and results in
the literature. UK studies after 1991 included Clare, Thomas, and Wickens (1994),
Clare, Psaradakis, and Thomas (1995), Black and Fraser (1995), and Pesaran and
Timmermann (2000).
Theoretical advances over Samuelson￿ s seminal paper by Leroy (1973), Rubinstein
(1976) and Lucas (1978) also made it clear that in the case of risk averse investors
tests of predictability of excess returns could not on their own con￿rm or falsify the
EMH. The neoclassical theory cast the EMH in the context of dynamic stochastic
(general) equilibrium models and showed that excess returns weighted by marginal
utility could be predictable. Only under risk neutrality, where marginal utility was
constant, the equilibrium condition implied the non-predictability of excess returns.
As Fama (1991) noted in his second review, the test of the EMH involved a joint
hypothesis - market e¢ ciency and the underlying equilibrium asset pricing model.
He concluded that ￿Thus, market e¢ ciency per se is not testable.￿(see p. 1575).
This, did not, however, mean that market e¢ ciency was not a useful concept. Almost
all areas of empirical economics are subject to the joint hypotheses problem.
7.2 Information and processing costs and the EMH
The EMH, in the sense of asset ￿ prices fully re￿ ect all available information￿was
also criticised by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who pointed out that there must be
￿su¢ cient pro￿t opportunities, i.e. ine¢ ciencies, to compensate investors for the
cost of trading and information-gathering."
Only in the extreme and unrealistic case where all information and trading costs
are zero one would expect prices to fully re￿ ect all available information. But if
information is in fact cost-less it would be known even before market prices are
22established.
As Fama recognized a weaker and economically more sensible version of the e¢ -
ciency hypothesis would be needed, namely ￿prices re￿ ect information to the point
where the marginal bene￿ts of acting on information (the pro￿ts to be made) do
not exceed the marginal costs." This in turn makes the task of testing the market
e¢ ciency even more complicated and would require equilibrium asset pricing models
that allowed for information and trading costs in markets with many di⁄erent traders
and with non-convergent beliefs.
In view of these di¢ culties some advocates of the EMH have opted for a trade-
based notion, and de￿ne markets as e¢ cient if it would not be possible for the
investors ￿... to earn above-average returns without accepting above-average risks.￿
Malkiel (2003) (see p.60). This notion can take account of information and transac-
tion costs and does not involve testing joint hypotheses. But this is far removed from
the basic idea of markets as e¢ cient allocators of capital investment across countries,
industries and ￿rms.
Beating the market as a test of market e¢ ciency also poses new challenges. Whilst
it is certainly possible to construct trading strategies (inclusive of transaction costs)
with Sharpe ratios that exceed those of the market portfolios ex post, such evidence
are unlikely to be convincing to the advocates of the EMH. It could be argued that
they are carried out with the bene￿t of hindsight, and are unlikely to be repeated in
real time. In this connections the following considerations would need to be born in
mind:
(a) Data mining/data snooping (Pesaran and Timmermann (2005)).
(b) Structural change and model instability (choice of observation window).
(c) The positive relationship that seem to exist between transaction costs and
predictability.
(d) Market volatility and learning.
(e) The ￿ Beat the market￿test is not that helpful either in shedding light on the
nature and the extent of market ine¢ ciencies. A more structural approach
would be desirable.
8 Theoretical foundations of the EMH
At the core of the EMH lies the following three basic premises:
231. Investor rationality: It is assumed that investors are rational, in the sense that
they correctly update their beliefs when new information is available.
2. Arbitrage: Individual investment decisions satisfy the arbitrage condition, and
trade decisions are made guided by the calculus of the subjective expected
utility theory a la Savage.
3. Collective rationality: Di⁄erences in beliefs across investors cancel out in the
market.
To illustrate how these premises interact, suppose that at the start of period (day,
week, month) t there are Nt traders (investors) that are involved in act of arbitrage
between a stock and a safe (risk-free) asset. Denote the one-period holding returns
on these two assets by Rt+1 and r
f
t , respectively. Following a similar line of argument














is his/her subjective expectations of the excess return,
Rt+1 ￿ r
f
t taken with respect to the information set
￿it = ￿it [ ￿t
where ￿t is the component of the information which is publicly available, ￿it > 0
represents trader￿ s risk premium, and ￿it > 0 is her/his information and trading costs
per unit of funds invested. In the absence of information and trading costs, ￿it can
be characterized in terms of the trader￿ s utility function, ui(cit), where ct is his/her
real consumption expenditures during the period t to t + 1, and is given by







￿ ^ Covi (mi;t+1;Rt+1 j￿it)
^ Ei (mi;t+1 j￿it)
where ^ Covi (:j￿it) is the subjective covariance operator condition on the trader￿ s
information set, ￿it, mi;t+1 = ￿iu0
i(ci;t+1)=u0
i(cit), which is known as the ￿ stochastic
discount factor￿ , u0
i(:) is the ￿rst derivative of the utility function, and ￿i is his/her
discount factor.
The expected returns could di⁄er across traders due to the di⁄erences in the
their perceived conditional probability distribution function of Rt+1 ￿ r
f
t , the di⁄er-
ences in their information sets, ￿it, the di⁄erences in their risk preferences, and/or



















is the ￿ true￿or ￿ objective￿conditional expectations. Fur-






































Therefore, under the REH, taking expectations of the individual arbitrage con-







= E (￿it + ￿it j￿t)







= E (￿it + ￿it j￿t) = ￿t; for all i
where ￿t is an average market measure of the combined risk premia and transaction
costs. The REH combined with perfect arbitrage ensure that di⁄erent traders have
the same expectations of ￿it + ￿it. Rationality and market discipline override in-
dividual di⁄erences in tastes, information processing abilities and other transaction








This is clearly compatible with trader-speci￿c ￿it and ￿it, so long as
￿it = ￿t + "it; E ("it j￿t) = 0
￿it = ￿t + ￿it;E (￿it j￿t) = 0
where "it and ￿it are distributed with mean zero independently of ￿t, and ￿t and ￿t
are known functions of the publicly available information.
Under this setting the extent to which excess returns can be predicted will depend
on the existence of a historically stable relationship between the risk premium, ￿t; and
the macro and business cycle indicators such as changes in interest rates, dividends
and various other indicators.
The rational expectations hypothesis is rather extreme which is unlikely to hold at
all times in all markets. Even if one assumes that in ￿nancial markets learning takes
25place reasonably fast, there will still be periods of turmoil where market participants
will be searching in the dark, trying and experimenting with di⁄erent models of
Rt+1 ￿ r
f








Herding and correlated behaviour across some of the traders could also lead to
further departures from the equilibrium RE solution. In fact the objective probability
distribution of Rt+1 ￿ r
f
t might itself be a⁄ected by market transactions based on







Market ine¢ ciencies provide further sources of stock market predictability by























































￿it measures the degree to which individual expectations di⁄ers from the correct






. A non-zero ￿it could arise from
individual irrationality, but not necessarily so. Rational individuals faced with an
uncertain environment, costly information and limitations on computing power could
rationally arrive at their expectations of future price changes that with hindsight
di⁄er from the correct ones.5 A non-zero ￿it could also arise due to disparity of
5This is in line with the premise of the recent paper by Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan (2010)
who maintain the axiom of rationality, but allow for dispersed information and the possibility of
information spillovers in the ￿nancial markets to explain market ine¢ ciencies.
26information across traders (including information asymmetries), and heterogeneous
priors due to model uncertainty or irrationality. Nevertheless, despite such individual
deviations, ￿ ￿wt which measures the extent of market or collective ine¢ ciency, could
be quite negligible. When Nt is su¢ ciently large, individual ￿ irrationality￿can cancel
out at the level of the market, so long as ￿it, i = 1;2;:::;Nt are not cross sectionally
strongly dependent, and no single trader dominates the market, in the sense that
wit = O(N
￿1
t ) at any time.6 Under these conditions at each point in time, t, the
average expected excess returns across the individual traders converges in quadratic
















, as Nt ! 1
In such periods the representative agent paradigm would be applicable and pre-
dictability of excess return will be governed solely by changes in business cycle con-
ditions and other publicly available information.7
However, in periods where traders￿individual expectations become strongly cor-
related (say as the result of herding or common over-reactions to distressing news)
￿ ￿wt need not be negligible even in thick markets with many traders; and market
ine¢ ciencies and pro￿table opportunities could prevail. Markets could also display
ine¢ ciencies without exploitable pro￿table opportunities if ￿ ￿wt is non-zero but there
is no stable predictable relationship between ￿ ￿wt and business cycle or other variables
that are observed publicly.
The evolution and composition of ￿ ￿wt can also help in shedding light on possible
bubbles or crashes developing in asset markets. Bubbles tend to develop in the after-
math of technological innovations that are commonly acknowledged to be important,
but with uncertain outcomes. The emerging common beliefs about the potential ad-
vantages of the new technology and the di¢ culties individual agents face in learning
how to respond to the new investment opportunities can further increase the gap
between average market expectations of excess returns and the associated objective
rational expectations outcome. Similar circumstances can also prevail during a crash
phase of the bubble when traders tend to move in tandem trying to reduce their risk
exposures all at the same time. Therefore, one would expect that during bubbles and
6Concepts of weak and strong cross section dependence are de￿ned and discussed in Chudik,
Pesaran, and Tosetti (2010).
7The heterogeneity of expectations across traders can also help in explaining large trading volume
observed in the ￿nancial markets; a feature which has proved di¢ cult to explain in representative
agent asset pricing models. But see Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) who relate the occurrence of
bubbles and crashes to changes in trading volume.
27crashes the individual errors, ￿it, to become more correlated, such that the average
errors, ￿ ￿wt, are no longer negligible. In contrast, at times of market calm the individ-
ual errors are likely to be weakly correlated, with the representative agent rational
expectations model being a reasonable approximation.
More formally note that since r
f
t and Pt are known at time t, then












Also to simplify the exposition assume that the length of the period t is su¢ ciently
small so that dividends are of secondary importance and
￿it t ^ Ei (￿ln(Pt+1)j￿it) ￿ ft;
where ft = E (￿ln(Pt+1)j￿t) is the unobserved price change expectations. Individ-
ual deviations, ￿it, could then become strongly correlated if individual expectations
^ Ei (￿ln(Pt+1)j￿it) di⁄er systematically from ft. For example, suppose that
^ Ei (￿ln(Pt+1)j￿it) = ￿it￿ln(Pt);
but ft = 0, namely in the absence of heterogeneous expectations ￿ln(Pt+1)would
have been unpredictable with a zero mean. Then it is easily seen that ￿ ￿wt =
￿ ￿wt￿ln(Pt), where ￿ ￿wt = ￿
Nt
i=1wit￿it. It is clear that ￿ ￿wt need not converge to zero
if in period t the majority of market participants believe future price changes are
positively related to past price changes, so that limNt!1 ￿ ￿wt > 0. In this simple
example price bubbles or crashes occur when ￿ ￿wt becomes positive over a relatively
long period.
It should be clear from the above discussion that testing for price bubbles re-
quires disaggregated time series information on individual beliefs and unobserved
price change expectations, ft. Analysis of aggregate time series observations can pro-
vide historical information about price reversals and some of their proximate causes.
But such information is unlikely to provide conclusive evidence of bubble formation
and its subsequent collapse. Survey data on traders￿individual beliefs combined with
suitable market proxies for ft are likely to be more e⁄ective in empirical analysis of
price bubbles.
An individual investor could be asked to respond to the following two questions
regarding the current and future price of a given asset:
1. Do you believe the current price is (a) just right (in the sense that the price is
in line with market fundamentals), (b) is above the fundamental price, or (c)
is below the fundamental price?
282. Do you expect the market price next period to (a) stay about the level it is
currently, (b) fall, or (c) rise?
In cases where the market is equilibrating we would expect a close association
between the proportion of respondents who select 1a and 2a, 1b and 2b, and 1c
and 2c. But in periods of bubbles (crashes) one would expect a large proportion of
respondents who select 1b (1c) to also select 2c (2b).
In situations where the equilibrating process is well established and commonly
understood, the second question is redundant. For example, if an individual states
that the room temperature is too high, it will be understood that he/she would prefer
less heating. The same is not applicable to ￿nancial markets and hence responses
to both questions are needed for a better understanding of the operations of the
markets and their evolution over time.
9 Exploiting pro￿table opportunities in practice
In ￿nancial markets the EMH is respected but not worshipped. It is recognized that
markets are likely to be e¢ cient most of the time but not all the time. Ine¢ ciencies
could arise particularly during periods of important institutional and technological
changes. It is not possible to know when and where market ine¢ ciencies arise in
advance - but it is believed that they will arise from time to time. Market traders
love volatility as it signals news and change with pro￿t possibilities to exploit. Iden-
ti￿cation of exploitable predictability tend to be fully diversi￿ed across markets for
bonds, equities and foreign exchange. Misalignments across markets for di⁄erent
assets and in di⁄erent countries often present the most important opportunities.
Examples include statistical arbitrage and global macro arbitrage trading rules.
Predictability and market liquidity are often closely correlated; less liquid mar-
kets are likely to be more predictable. Market predictability and liquidity need to
be jointly considered in developing pro￿table trading strategies. Return forecasting
models used in practice tend to be recursive and adaptive along the lines developed
in Pesaran and Timmermann (1995) and recently reviewed in Pesaran and Tim-
mermann (2005). Recursive modelling (RM) approach is also in line with the more
recent developments in behavioural ￿nance. The RM approach aims at minimizing
the e⁄ect of hindsight and data snooping (a problem that a› icts all ex post return
regressions), and explicitly designed to take account of the potential instability of
the return regressions over time. For example, Pesaran and Timmermann (1995)
￿nd that the switching trading rule manages to beat the market only during periods
of high volatility where learning might be incomplete and markets ine¢ cient.
29Pesaran and Timmermann (2005) provide a review of the recursive modelling
approach, its use in derivation of trading rules and discuss a number of practical
issues in their implementation such as the choice of the universe of factors over which
to search, choice of the estimation window, how to take account of measurement and
model uncertainty, how to cross validate the RM, and how and when to introduce
model innovations.
The RM approach still faces many challenges ahead. As Pesaran and Timmer-
mann (2005) conclude:
￿Automated systems reduce, but do not eliminate the need for discretion in real
time decision making. There are many ways that automated systems can be designed
and implemented. The space of models over which to search is huge and is likely
to expand over time. Di⁄erent approximation techniques such as genetic algorithms,
simulated annealing and MCMC algorithms can be used. There are also many theoret-
ically valid model selection or model averaging procedures. The challenge facing real
time econometrics is to provide insight into many of these choices that researchers
face in the development of automated systems.￿
Return forecasts need to be incorporated in sound risk management systems. For
this purpose point forecasts are not su¢ cient and joint probability forecast densities
of a large number of inter-related asset returns will be required. Transaction and
slippage costs need to be allowed for in the derivation of trade rules. Slippage arises
when long (short) orders, optimally derived based on currently observed prices, are
placed in rising (falling) markets. Slippage can be substantial, and are in addition
to the usual transactions costs.
Familiar risk measures such as the Sharpe ratio and the VaR are routinely used
to monitor and valuate the potential of trading systems. But due to cash constraint
(for margin calls etc.) it is large drawdowns that are most feared. Prominent re-
cent examples are the downfall of Long Term Capital who experienced substantial
drawdowns in 1998 following the Russian ￿nancial crisis, and the collapse of Lehman
Brothers during the global ￿nancial crisis of 2008.
Successful traders might not be (and usually are not) better in forecasting returns
than many others in the market. What they have is a sense of ￿ big￿opportunities
when they are con￿dent of making a ￿ kill￿ .
10 New research directions
We have identi￿ed two important sources of return predictability and possible prof-
itable opportunities. One relates to the familiar business cycle e⁄ects and involves
modelling ￿t, de￿ned by (19), in terms of the publicly available information, ￿t￿1.
30The second relates to the average deviations of individual traders￿ s expectations from
the "correct" unknown expectations, as measured by ￿ ￿wt and de￿ned by (20)). As
noted earlier this component could vary considerably over time and need not be re-
lated to business cycle factors. It tends to be large during periods of ￿nancial crisis
when correlation of mis-pricing across traders rise, and tend to be negligible during
periods of market calm when correlations are low. Over the past three decades much
of the research in ￿nance and macroeconomics has focussed on modelling of ￿t, and
by comparison little attention has been paid to ￿ ￿wt. This is clearly an important
area for future research. Our discussions also point to a number of related areas for
further research. There are clearly
- Limits to rational expectations (for an early treatment see Pesaran (1987)), also
see the recent paper on Survey Expectations by Pesaran and Weale (2006).
- Limits to arbitrage due to liquidity requirements and institutional constraints.
- Herding and correlated behaviour with noise traders entering markets during
bull periods and deserting during bear periods.
Behavioral ￿nance, complexity theory and the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis re-
cently advocated by Lo (2004) all try, in one way or another, to address the above
sources of the departures from the EMH. Some of the recent developments in behav-
ioural ￿nance are reviewed in Baberis and Thaler (2003).
Farmer and Lo (1999) focus on the recent research that views the ￿nancial mar-
kets from a biological perspective and, speci￿cally, within an evolutionary framework
in which markets, instruments, institutions, and investors interact and evolve dynam-
ically according to the ￿ law￿of economic selection. Under this view, ￿nancial agents
compete and adapt, but they do not necessarily do so in an optimal fashion.
Special care should also be exercised in evaluation of return predictability and
trading rules. To minimize the e⁄ects of hindsight in such analysis recursive mod-
elling techniques discussed in Pesaran and Timmermann (1995), Pesaran and Tim-
mermann (2000) and Pesaran and Timmermann (2005) seem much more appropriate
than the return regressions on a ￿xed set of regressors/factors that are estimated ex
post on historical data.
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